Animal Experimentation: Science or Violence?
As part of our ongoing exploration of nonhuman animal personhood, I would like to share the following essay I composed roughly four years ago in a business ethics course I took at STLCC - Meramec. Titled “Human Infants as a Test Case for Animal Experimentation,” this essay forces us to critically reflect on the following question: if we wouldn’t experiment on human infants, then who are we to experiment upon similarly situated nonhuman animals?
While the debate over factory farms and slaughterhouses has largely resolved in favor of the following two propositions—that these institutions are seriously morally wrong, and that we ought not support them for numerous environmental, health, and ethical reasons—the debate over the use of animals in research continues to rage, both in medical circles and society at large. Though critics cite systemic rights violations as reasons for their opposition to animal experimentation (AE), proponents dismiss these charges, pointing instead to the greater social good allegedly facilitated by these experiments. This division reflects not only radically different answers to the question of whether AE is morally justified, but also morally distinct systems of reasoning—utilitarian and deontological—that continue to fuel this ongoing debate. In this essay, I will argue that AE is only justified in extremely limited circumstances, using the argument from marginal cases to demonstrate that if we reject the use of human infants in AE, we must also reject the use of relevantly similar nonhuman animals in these experiments as well.
Although Peter Singer has articulated slightly different views about AE over the years (Crawley), we can use his idea of speciesism to mount a potent criticism of the rhetoric used by many AE proponents. In a question, would we tolerate the use of human infants in AE? Since it seems intuitively obvious we would not tolerate the use of human infants in such experiments, we must ask ourselves whether we should tolerate the use of relevantly similar nonhuman animals in these experiments as well, a question forcefully raised by the argument from marginal cases (AMC). This now famous argument alleges that if human “marginal cases,” such as infants, the mentally handicapped, and the severely senile, possess moral value, then so, too, do certain non-human animals (Wilson). More strongly still, the AMC implies that, in the lack of a morally relevant difference, we must treat two marginal cases alike, whether human or nonhuman. If the AMC succeeds, then we must acknowledge no morally relevant difference obtains between at least some humans and at least some nonhuman animals. It is possible, then, that a dog, rat, or cow could be the moral equivalent of a human infant, jointly possessing qualities such as an experiential welfare, preference-interests, and the capacity to suffer.
Yet many proponents of AE will here object, noting many nonhuman animals do not properly belong to our moral community (Hepworth), an argument delineated by philosopher Carl Cohen as follows—only members of our moral community possess moral worth; nonhuman animals do not belong to this moral community; therefore, nonhuman animals do not possess moral worth (Regan 2001). But this rather archaic argument is easily refuted. Notice how our sphere of moral compassion has expanded outward over time, such that, in the past, African slaves, gays, and women were not fully members of a predefined “moral community.” This exclusion implies an unacceptable level of arbitrariness that better reflects social prejudices—such as racism, sexism, and speciesism—than the inherent incompatibility of including many nonhuman animals in our moral community, an observation fortified by considering the many morally relevant commonalities, such as sentience, intentionality, and emotion, shared by both humans and many nonhuman animals. At the very least, the proponent must present a compelling case that explains why excluding certain beings from the moral community but not relevantly similar beings within the community owes to some legitimate, morally disqualifying attribute and not to some irrational, unexamined prejudice, such as speciesism.
But the proponent is not without recourse. To deny the seemingly undeserved, preferential treatment given to human beings, the proponent can postulate morally relevant differences—from species membership to potential personhood—that justify the exclusionary treatment of many nonhuman animals. The most convincing line of argument proceeds as follows—human infants, as future adults, have the potential to become full-fledged persons, entitling infants to special considerations many nonhuman animals lack (Hepworth). Even so, would we tolerate the use of infants in AE, given the single proviso these infants were mentally handicapped? Although not without controversy, many ethicists would oppose such a practice on the grounds it routinely overrides the rights of these infants, from the right to bodily integrity to the right to life, even if these infants happen to be mentally incapacitated. This dissent arises from the simple consideration low intelligence does not necessarily preclude the possession of fundamental rights, predicated on morally relevant faculties—such as the capacity for suffering—that can exist independently of refined, higher-order thinking skills. As long as an individual suffers, that suffering must be weighed equally with the like suffering of others, a moral valuation that mirrors Peter Singer’s principle of equal consideration of interests. By this principle, in conjunction with the AMC, if we reject the use of human infants in AE, then, by equally valid moral reasoning, we must reject the use of morally similar nonhuman animals in these experiments as well; otherwise, we must accept the use of at least some infants in certain experiments we would normally reserve for all and only nonhuman animals.
Now, the foregoing arguments do not demonstrate the superiority of rights-based ethics to utility-based ethics, a task far beyond the scope of this essay; they merely demonstrate that, to remain logically consistent, a proponent who objects to the use of human infants on deontological grounds must also object to the use of relevantly similar nonhuman animals in such experiments on the same grounds. If consistency is moreover a key component of justice, and justice is itself a moral good—two generally accepted propositions—then opposing the use of beings relevantly similar to human infants in AE is the logical outcome. Nor do the preceding arguments directly attack the most common, direct justification for AE—the greater social good that AE supposedly serves. In the remainder of this essay, we will discuss the implications of the rights view on the moral status of AE, clarifying why many rights-based critics oppose AE in almost every instance.
To motivate this argument, we return once more to the issue of using human infants in AE. Consider the following dilemma—would we accept this use if it had the potential to contribute significantly to medical advances that could reduce human suffering? While AE has doubtlessly contributed to many medical advances, from the development of artificial heart valves to the discovery of numerous vaccines, the deontologist likely opposes AE for primarily Kantian reasons. Namely, by justifying the routine suspension of rights because of the potential utility generated as a result, we systematically fail to respect many non-human animals as subjects-of-a-life, valuing them for their utility to others, not as ends in themselves (Regan 2004, p. 393). This fundamental disrespect then constitutes sufficient grounds, according to the critic, for rejecting AE, with but a few notable exceptions. If, for example, AE could proceed without compromising the intrinsic rights—such as the right to a decent life—many sentient beings allegedly possess, then such experimentation may be morally permissible. But seeing as the vast majority of AE results in needless confinement, stress, boredom, frustration, mutilation, and untimely death, AE, as currently practiced, is almost universally proscribed under the rights view (Regan 2004, p. 370-71).
Rejoining our overarching argument, we must ask ourselves at what point, if ever, we could tolerate the use of human infants in such experiments. If we subscribe to a Kantian approach, whereby valuing others merely as a means to an end is morally objectionable, then we must oppose this experimentation, even if the benefits to society outweigh the harms caused to human infants or their moral equivalents. Even so, it seems at least logically possible a situation may arise wherein the harm of abstaining from AE could so eclipse the harm of pursuing it, we would be morally obligated to conduct these experiments, even if they fundamentally disrespect the rights of “test subjects.” Even Tom Regan accepts this possibility, provided the harm to each member of the few is prima facie comparable to the harm of each member of the many, per his “miniride principle” (Regan 2004, p. 305). To satisfy this condition, all members of a moral transaction must face morally comparable harms and benefits, a reality which is rarely the case in AE. For, in the course of AE, the nonhuman “assays” usually stand to lose everything, from their freedom, to their mental well-being, to their very lives, whereas humans stand to gain little, if anything, from each individual experiment. This highly asymmetrical relationship implies the wrongness of AE, whereby over 100 million animals are “sacrificed” for research each year in the US alone; the probable benefits simply do not outweigh the probable harms and rights violations of AE. The harm of AE thus adumbrated, our central claim resurfaces more resolute than ever—if we oppose the use of human infants in AE, we must, mutatis mutandis, reject the use of morally similar nonhuman animals in these experiments as well.
Works Cited
Crawley, William. "Peter Singer Defends Animal Experimentation." BBC. British Broadcasting Corporation, 26 Nov. 2006. Web. 12 Dec. 2016.
Hepworth, Adam. "Animal Research: The Ethics of Animal Experimentation." HOPES. Stanford University, 6 July 2010. Web. 12 Dec. 2016.
Regan, Tom. "Mapping Human Rights." Defending Animal Rights. Urbana: U of Illinois, 2001. 80-83. Print.
Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: U of California, 2004. Print.
Wilson, Scott D. "Animals and Ethics." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2016.
