Logically Fallacious: Exposing the Core Fallacies of Carnism

Imagine you are attending a family reunion at Olive Garden, when you overhear your niece asking the waiter for vegetarian options. After the waiter leaves, you ask your niece why she has become a vegetarian. But as she begins formulating an honest response to your legitimate question, her father suddenly hushes her—“this is neither the time nor the place,” he mutters. As your niece tries to explain otherwise, a nearby aunt soon vents her frustration, remarking venomously “respect my personal choice, and I’ll respect yours,” while a nearby uncle pronounces his adamant, almost boundless love for bacon. Then your nephew chimes in, adding “We’ve always eaten meat. Why should we stop now?”

These responses to the vegetarian proposition are all too common. But just how satisfactory are these responses to the serious moral dilemma that faces the modern American omnivore? And why do we hear the same responses, over and over again, to the vegetarian life-stance? And even more crucially, why do we never ask ourselves these questions?  In this essay, we will critically examine these common responses to the vegetarian proposition. In so doing, we will document the extensive, core fallacies of carnism that saturate almost every conversation about vegetarianism. As we advance through this paper, we will realize, ever more clearly, that the vast majority of responses to the vegetarian life-stance are, indeed, classic, text-book fallacies, which nevertheless remain remarkably popular, even among otherwise intelligent, educated individuals. 

Before we proceed, I would like to clarify what I mean by “carnism.” Carnism is a concept, developed most famously by Dr. Melanie Joy, Harvard-educated winner of the Ahimsa Nonviolence Award, which features past winners such as Nelson Mandela and the Dalai Lama, that refers to the hidden psychology of meat, namely, a cluster of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors which underlie our everyday choices to eat certain animals, but not others (1). Such persistent, core beliefs include meat is natural, normal, necessary, and nice, many of the same arguments we just heard in response to your niece’s vegetarianism (2). We shall begin with these responses to the vegetarian proposition first due to their sheer prominence. In fact, a recent study indicated that the vast majority, between 83-91%, of the justifications people give for eating dead animals falls into just four categories—meat is natural, normal, necessary, and nice (3). So let us begin with the charge meat is natural. 

According to this line of argument, the alleged naturalness of eating dead animals is sufficient to establish the goodness of this behavior. For example, a carnist, one heavily influenced by carnism, might argue that, since humans are natural carnivores, eating meat is not only morally acceptable, but morally preferable. Such an individual might also cite the “circle of life,” a defense which alleges that, since predation occurs in the natural world, and humans are part of the natural world, we may justifiably engage in predation as well, just like other species. Such an individual might further believe that humans naturally preside at the top of the food chain, and so it is only natural that we predate other species. Finally, such an individual might argue, that since people seem naturally inclined to kill other animals, and since following our nature is good, killing other animals is also good. 

But all these arguments suffer from a key deficiency—namely, the appeal to nature, a well-established informal fallacy. According to this age-old fallacy, something is good in virtue of its alleged naturalness. Yet many things we consider natural we would not also consider good. Consider cancer, Ebola, and HIV. All of these belong to the natural world and are therefore natural, but would we ever describe the spread of the HIV virus as anything other than horrific? Natural disasters, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes, furnish additional examples of things we consider natural but do not necessarily consider good. From these examples, we may abstract that the alleged naturalness of something is insufficient to establish the goodness of the thing in question. Thus, the foregoing arguments are likewise insufficient to establish the goodness of eating dead animals.

A second line of attack against arguments which rely on the appeal to nature proceeds thusly—what does natural even mean? So far, we have used natural to mean of, relating to, or belonging in the natural world. But by this definition, everything with naturalistic explanations, that is, everything material and dictated by material processes, would belong to the natural world. By such definition, Styrofoam is as natural as infanticide is as natural as eating the remnant body parts of dead animals raised in factory farms. But so defined, the word “natural” is rendered practically meaningless due to its breadth. Thus circumscribed, there would moreover appear to be little connection between what is natural and what is good. Thus, we have demonstrated that the appeal to nature is weak due to inherent difficulties in meaningfully defining and applying the word “natural.”

Once we adequately respond to the charge meat is natural, it is all too common for an argument between a vegetarian and a carnist to proceed to the next claim, meat is normal. According to this objection, the perceived normality of consuming dead animals from factory farms provides a sufficient justification for their continued consumption. Such an individual may note the ubiquity of dead animals and their consumption in our culture, the prevalence of pro-meat attitudes among Americans, and the perception that vegetarians are abnormal. Motivated by the appeal to normality, such an individual might also argue that the circle of life, human supremacy, and the connection between meat and masculinity, being perfectly “normal,” ordain our consumption of dead animals. 

Yet all these responses suffer from yet another common key deficiency, the appeal to normality. Although this fallacy evades most textbooks, it is nevertheless one of the hundreds of informal fallacies that cloud reasoning. Bo Bennett, successful entrepreneur and author of Logically Fallacious, a book which documents over 300 common fallacies, characterizes the logical form of the appeal to normality as follows—“x is considered normal behavior; therefore x is good behavior” (4). But many behaviors considered normal, such procrastinating, acting selfishly, and overindulging, are not demonstrably good behaviors, or are at least behaviors that are not demonstrably good in all cases. Thus, the perceived normality of something is insufficient to establish the goodness of that thing. 

To further demonstrate this insufficiency, let us examine two instances where the perceived normality of something failed to guarantee its moral goodness. Consider, for example, slavery. Throughout history, numerous human societies, including the colonial Americas, considered owning slaves normal, with entire social institutions structured around this ownership. Yet the perceived normality of slavery, as we now realize in our post-Enlightenment world, does not justify the slavery in question. Likewise, the perceived normality of eating dead animals from factory farms and slaughterhouses is insufficient to establish the moral goodness of practices such as factory farming and the support thereof, however commonplace, accepted, and “normal” these practices may seem in our society. In fact, we have serious reason to reject factory farming and the support thereof, contrary to the moral acceptability of factory farming implied by the appeal to normality. 

But the carnist, thus challenged, will often proceed to the next claim—meat is necessary. According to this objection, it is necessary, for various reasons, to eat dead animals, with the reasons most-cited including proper nutrition, reducing the farm animal population, and feeding the human population. For example, many carnists argue that consuming dead animals is necessary for obtaining certain key nutrients, such as protein, iron, and calcium, while other carnists argue that it is necessary to eat dead animals in order to mitigate the swollen farm animal population, which now numbers over 56 billion worldwide (5). Meanwhile, other carnists argue that, to feed the human population, we must raise and kill billions of animals for food each year. But as we will soon reveal, these repeat appeals to necessity rarely, if ever, establish that eating dead animals is, indeed, necessary for any of the reasons just enumerated. 

Consider first the claim that meat is necessary for proper nutrition. While one author has described this claim as perhaps the easiest of the “four N’s”—natural, normal, necessary, and nice—to scientifically refute, I believe we should paint a slightly more nuanced picture. Namely, while it is undeniable, as the American Dietetic Association, a nationally recognized authority on nutrition, writes, that “appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total vegetarian or vegan diets, are healthful, nutritionally adequate, and may provide health benefits in the prevention and treatment of certain diseases” (6), it is also that true vegetarians and vegans must ensure a reliable source of vitamin B12, the only nutrient which is almost unavoidably lacking in an un-supplemented vegetarian or vegan diet. But with proper vitamin B12 supplementation, vegetarians and vegans can easily enjoy markedly better health than the average American omnivore.

Having established that eating dead animals is not necessary for proper nutrition, let us examine our next claim under the appeal to necessity, that eating dead animals is necessary to regulate the swollen farm animal population. Yet this claim, in addition to failing to demonstrate necessity, actually commits the fallacy of suppressed evidence, for, if we were to consider all the evidence, we would reach a drastically different conclusion from the one proposed. Namely, were we to adequately account for the fact that people artificially breed billions of cows, chickens, and pigs into existence far beyond the populations these farm animals would naturally sustain without such severe human intervention, we would realize that the best solution to farm animal overpopulation is not to continually “cull the herd,” but to stop breeding these animals into existence at such numbers in the first place, thus ending the cycle of farm animal overpopulation.

We may now proceed to the final claim under the appeal to necessity, namely, that it is necessary to raise and kill animals for food to feed the human population. But according to a recent study published by the University of Minnesota, roughly 36% of all food calories grown worldwide are fed to animals, who return only a fraction of the input (7). But if we were to feed these crops directly to human beings, we could feed an additional 3-4 billion people, as this study calculates. Confronted with mounting evidence, the UN even indicated in a recent report that “impacts from agriculture are expected to increase substantially due to… increasing consumption of animal products,” and that a “substantial reduction of impacts would only be possible with a substantial worldwide diet change, away from animal products” (emphasis added, 8). So contrary to alleged necessity of eating dead animals to feed the world, the reverse is actually true. For, to realistically and reliably feed the world, we must significantly reduce animal product consumption (9).

Having refuted yet another central tenet of carnism, we may proceed, at last, to our final “N” of justification—meat is nice. A carnist who evokes this defense may do so for gustatory, aesthetic, or cultural reasons, though the gustatory defense is the most common. According to this defense, the gustatory pleasure derived from eating dead animals, for whatever reason, outweighs other considerations, such as the suffering behind the animal products we so adore (10). A carnist particularly indebted to eating dead animals, such as Chef Gordon Ramsay, may even argue that preparing the corpses of dead animals is a bona fide art from, worthy of respect, appreciation, and cultivation. Meanwhile, another carnist might argue that eating dead animals satisfies important social functions, such as venerating tradition, uniting families for mealtime, and sharing camaraderie with others. 

Yet the question immediately arises—what makes eating dead animals from factory farms and slaughterhouses so “nice?” It is it the chronic abuse, the habitual deprivation, or the horrific deaths? Is it the heart disease, the diabetes, or the colon cancer? Or is it the pollution, the depletion, and the waste? To claim that meat is nice is to ignore its overwhelming badness. But not only does the claim "meat is nice" commit the fallacy of suppressed evidence, it also betrays yet another fallacy—the fallacy of equivocation. To highlight this fallacy, just consider the argument implicit in statements such as “Bacon!” in response to the vegetarian proposition. We may formalize such an argument as follows—dead animals taste good; therefore, eating dead animals is good. But to derive this conclusion, we must equivocate on what we mean by good, from pleasant in taste, to good, ethically speaking. Since this argument relies upon a fundamental equivocation, the conclusion does not follow from the given premise. Even avoiding the fallacy fallacy, in which we assume that just because the reasoning in question is fallacious, the conclusion is false, it is far more likely, given the foregoing analysis, that no tidy argument demonstrates that eating dead animals from factory farms and slaughterhouses is good; in fact, our arguments would seem to indicate otherwise—eating dead animals from factory farms and slaughterhouses, far from being “nice,” almost certainly constitutes a serious moral wrong.

Thus have we now refuted the four N's of justification—that meat is natural, normal, necessary, and nice. In the first instance, we demonstrated that the perceived naturalness of eating dead animals from factory farms and slaughterhouses is insufficient to establish the goodness of this behavior, if only because there are many things we consider natural, but which we do not simultaneously consider good. In the second instance, we demonstrated that the perceived normality of eating dead animals from factory farms and slaughterhouses is once more insufficient to demonstrate the goodness of this behavior, if only because what we consider normal is not always what we consider good. In the third instance, we demonstrated that eating dead animals from factory farms and slaughter-houses is simply not necessary for proper nutrition, reducing the farm animal population, or feeding the human population. In the fourth and final instance, we demonstrated that the niceness of meat is an illusion, unsupported by the reality that meat entails for the animals, our health, and the environment. Whereas the first two instances descend from common, informal fallacies, the appeal to nature and the appeal to normality, respectively, the latter two descend from the fallacy of suppressed evidence and the fallacy of equivocation, respectively. Thus, we have demonstrated that the core justifications for carnism are also relatively straightforward fallacies. And in so doing, we have classified the vast majority of responses to the vegetarian proposition as utter fallacy.

But before I conclude our essay, I would like to address several criticisms, discuss my observations about other objections to the vegetarian proposition, and identify avenues forward in a carnistic world. To address the criticisms I anticipate, I will answer the following questions. First, why is carnism so central to my analysis? Second, why do I focus almost exclusively on factory farmed animals? What about humane alternatives? Finally, why do I dismiss the 4 N's of justification so readily when I have yet to examine their every facet? What about exceptions to my arguments? The first question will answer why I included carnism in an essay more fundamentally about the fallacious objections to the vegetarian proposition, while the second question will not only clarify my use of language, but also explain my particular fixation on factory farmed animals, rather than perceived humane alternatives. Meanwhile, the final question will explain why we can, with confidence, dismiss the 4 N's of justification as illegitimate responses to the vegetarian proposition. We will ultimately conclude that carnism relies upon a rich constellation of mutually-reinforcing fallacies, such that, when overcome, the vegetarian proposition emerges as one of the greatest moral propositions in the history of mankind (11).

Throughout this essay, I have used the concept of carnism to provide a mental framework for both organizing and conceptualizing the most common fallacies we encounter in response to the vegetarian proposition, namely, the 4 N's of justification. Next, I focus on factory farmed animals for many compelling reasons, but in the extremely limited space of this essay, let me give the primary one. Namely, after researching and debating the everyday treatment of animals for over eight years, I have noticed that even the most intelligent, educated, and philosophically literate individuals would rather consider farfetched scenarios, such as the infamous desert island, or quibble over minutiae, such as precisely which moral dilemmas Tom Regan's theory of animal rights fails to resolve, than address the overwhelming reality before them—that is, the undeniable evil of factory farming in which they daily participate. And after all these years of desert islands, lifeboats, and “humane” alternatives, I have discovered a primary carnistic defense—find an alleged weakness within the vegetarian proposition, then pretend you are justified in supporting factory farming. This argument takes the form “I postulate x as a weakness in the vegetarian proposition; therefore, I will continue supporting factory farming.” 

With a few, specific examples, we can demonstrate the absurdity of this line of reasoning, which arises precisely because of the cognitive dissonance of being morally opposed to, yet behaviorally supportive of, factory farms and slaughterhouses, a moral anxiety carnistic defenses were crafted to alleviate. Consider the following examples—“Regan's moral theory is incomplete; therefore, I will continue supporting something virtually every moral theory condemns,” “killing animals in self-defense may be justified in certain situations; therefore, I will continue supporting something that has almost nothing to do with self-defense,” and, finally, “veganism will not end all animal suffering; therefore, I will continue supporting one of the greatest causes of animal suffering.” In each of these instances, the carnist wants to find an absolution from a mind distraught—otherwise, why seek so vigorously to deny the vegetarian proposition (12)? And without fully realizing it, the carnist almost always at least implicitly advances the conclusion that he or she is justified in continuing to support factory farming, even if he or she does not explicitly say so, thus committing the fallacy of red herring, among a host of other fallacies of relevance. 

I report these observations with great confidence, for years of debate have taught me the great trickery carnism plays on our brains. Namely, carnism will compel us to find a rationalization for our continued support of factory farms and slaughterhouses where no such compelling justification actually exists. For, as Emily Moran Barwick, artist, activist, unabashed vegan, and creator of the Bite Size Vegan channel on Youtube, recently intoned in perhaps the single greatest introduction to an animal rights speech ever given, carnism is a lie, “and not just any lie, but one carefully crafted, finely tuned, expertly executed, and deliberately designed with the express purpose of assuring you that wrong [is] right, that bad [is] good, and that violence [is] love; a lie powerful enough to manipulate you into taking part in horrific and barbaric acts that you would otherwise find appalling; powerful enough to wash blood from your hands, to alter your perspective so severely that murder appears mundane, and compassion appears extreme” (13). No wonder we succumb so frequently to the sheer power, seduction, and intoxication of the grand lie of carnism.

Having exposed the almost unfathomable depths of one of the greatest lies ever told, we emerge, at last, at the true reason I focus on factory farmed animals—because I demand intellectual honesty (14). For, if we were intellectually honest with ourselves and each other, we would acknowledge the reality that the vast majority, roughly 98-99%, of all meat, eggs, and dairy in this country comes from factory farms, according to USDA and EPA statistics (15). Moreover, we would acknowledge that the vast majority, if not all, of the meat, eggs, and dairy we individually consume comes from factory farms and slaughterhouses. Until we address these the most daily of behaviors, I do not believe that we are entitled to proceed to those the rarest of situations (16). So it is time we stopped focusing on the desert islands, the lifeboats, and the Eskimos; it is time we critically examined our support of factory farms and slaughterhouses and lived in alignment with our core values of justice, love, respect, compassion, and nonviolence toward all rather than in the wake of death, murder, and destruction perpetuated by the core fallacies of carnism.

Footnotes

1. My definition of carnism is deeply indebted to the work of Dr. Melanie Joy. You may learn more about her work, including her definition of carnism, by visiting her website, http://www.carnism.org/carnism. You may also watch her eye-opening TED talk on Youtube, titled “Beyond Carnism: Toward Rational, Authentic Food Choices,” available here—https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0VrZPBskpg. I strongly recommend you watch her TED talk on the revolutionary concept of carnism, one of the most enlightening concepts you will ever encounter.

2. Once more, I am heavily indebted to Dr. Melanie Joy’s groundbreaking work, particularly in her book Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows, where she first articulated the three N’s—meat is natural, normal, and necessary. If you have the time, I would strongly recommend her book as well. It is extremely easy to read, taking me but one evening to complete, and it also provides fresh, fascinating philosophical and psychological insight into the soi-disant paradox of meat.

3. This particular scientific study, titled “Rationalizing Meat Consumption: The 4 Ns,” appears on ScienceDirect.com, a publisher of peer-reviewed scholarly journals. Other than revealing that the vast majority of responses to the vegetarian proposition are fallacious, as we have already demonstrated, this study also reveals that carnists who employ the 4 N’s of justification tend to feel “less-proud” of eating dead animals from factory farms and slaughterhouses, while those who strongly endorse the 4 N’s tend to experience “less guilt about their animal-product decisions, highlighting,” as we would suspect, “the guilt-alleviating function of the 4Ns.” This result also validates common experience, because most carnists, with enough prompting, will admit they feel guilty about their continued support of factory farms and slaughterhouses. To remediate this guilt, I simply suggest doing your best to avoid supporting factory farms and slaughterhouses. Indeed, most people feel greatly relieved after they embrace a healthy, plant-based diet, so I recommend you do so as well, especially given your devotion to critical thinking. 

4. The appeal to normality appears on Bo Bennett’s website, www.logicallyfallacious.com, a website which inspired the title of this essay. You may find the exact address from which I extracted the appeal to normality here— https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/37/Appeal_to_Normality. 

5. I found this statistic on WorldWatch.org in a research paper titled “Meat Production Continues to Rise,” though this statistic ultimately descends from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. However, due to a lack of records, it is difficult to quantify the exact number of farm animals alive at any given time. Even so, slaughter totals may well exceed the given statistic, since the number of chickens slaughtered each year alone may exceed 50 billion. This figure also does not include the number of animals killed by fishing, zoos, and other animal enterprises. 

6. This quote descends from the ADA’s position paper on vegetarian and vegan diets, found here—http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19562864.

7. This information descends from a report titled “Redefining Agricultural Yields: from Tonnes to People Nourished per Hectare” published on http://iopscience.iop.org/.

8. I found this information on an article titled UN Urges Global Move to Meat and Dairy-free Diets, published by www.theguardian.com, though this information ultimately descends from a recent UN report titled “Assessing the Environmental Impacts of Consumption and Production: Priority Products and Materials.”

9. Carnists frequently argue that a global shift toward a plant-based diet will not automatically solve world hunger, a view I share. Nevertheless, a global shift toward a plant-based diet is an integral part of the solution to world hunger, and must be, as the UN rightly acknowledges. But many carnists, unassuaged, insist that, for certain people, particularly those in developing countries, the consumption of animal products may be necessary either for continued existence or proper nutrition. Even so, this reality would still not justify the carnist’s all too likely support of factory farms or slaughterhouses. But focusing on the particularly misfortunate individuals to whom these carnists refer, I will respond two ways. First, as per Tom Regan’s arguments in his 1983 classic, The Case for Animal Rights, death is prima facie harm in that it forecloses opportunities for satisfaction. Death thus poses a significant harm to many non-human animals killed against their will at a fraction their natural lifespan for no good reason. Second, the argument from marginal cases, detailed in the recent book, Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, indicates that many nonhuman animals, at least those as mentally sophisticated as cats, dogs, cows, chickens, and pigs, qualify as the moral equivalent of human children. Taken together, these two views indicate that we must satisfy an extremely stringent set of criteria in order to ensure the justifiability of killing, a standard which is almost never met, even among people living in the third world. 

10. At this point, some carnists may object that the human pleasure derived from eating dead animals from factory farms and slaughterhouses outweighs the suffering of these non-human animals. Such carnists may then allege that, by the utilitarian calculus, we morally ought to consume dead animals from factory farms and slaughterhouses. But we may immediately refute this argument by noting that we can obtain just as much, if not more, gustatory pleasure from entirely plant-based sources, thus eliminating the dire “need” for billions of animals suffering in factory farms and at slaughterhouses. Undeterred, a particularly robust carnist may nevertheless insist that there exist certain ways to ethically procure animal products. To this objection, I rightly cede, but it still fails to secure the resounding victory many carnists desire. For example, eating grass-fed cows does not exempt us from wrongdoing, for most grass-fed cows are killed whereupon they reach market weight, around 27 months of age. Thus deprived of life against their will at a fraction their natural lifespan for no good reason, we have still committed a serious wrong. Misnomers, such as “free-range,” “cage-free,” “organic,” “natural,” and “humane” aside, it is, nevertheless, still possible to ethically consume certain animal products. For example, suppose your cow, Chloe, having lived a long, happy life, dies in the middle of the field of natural causes. Could you ethically consume her corpse? Perhaps. Could you generalize such a pattern of consumption? Probably not. To explain why, suppose we respect her legitimate interest in continued existence (see Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, section 3.4 and 3.5, and Luzynski, “A Sentiocentric Resolution to the Abortion Debate,” for a more complete discussion of this legitimate interest in continued existence.) Suppose moreover that we respect the legitimate interests in continued existence of other cows who are like Chloe in morally relevant ways. Then, instead of sending mother cows to slaughter after their productivity declines around age four or five, due to the constant demands of forced pregnancy and lactation, suppose we allow Chloe and mother cows like her to live not only on lush, green pastures, but also with their beloved children. Suppose moreover that we allow Chloe and mother cows like her to live for a full twenty years, their natural lifespan. However bucolic a scene you construct, we have an enormous problem. To see how, let us reconceptualize the problem before us. Imagine we have four generations, generations g1, g2, g3, and g4, each equally populated and each separated by exactly one year of age, such that we have an equal number each of one-, two-, three-, and four-year-old cows. Suppose moreover that each generation of 4-year-old cows bears an equal number of babies, such that the cycle can proceed indefinitely, each generation exactly replaced by the next. But we want to preserve Chloe’s right to life, alongside the right to life of all cows like her. So we allow Chloe and all cows like her to enjoy their natural lifespan, anywhere from 20-25 years. Yet we also want to produce the same amount of “meat” year from year, as we presently do. Before we know it, we have generations g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7, g8…, g18, g19, and g20, effectively more than quadrupling the number of cows in existence. But to do so would constitute an even greater ecological insanity than the one to which we are currently partaken. Hence, there is presently no way to ethically produce enough meat to satisfy our current demand while simultaneously respecting the legitimate interests in continued existence that mother cows possess. Thus, the carnist has in no way achieved the blowout victory for which he initially hoped.

11. Other propositions of this magnitude include “all men are created equal” and “justice for all.”

12. Another possibility is that the vegetarian proposition is somehow laughably false or truly despicable, but what reason do we have, all considered, to seriously believe either of these accusations? In actuality, it is extremely likely that the vegetarian proposition is true, although some modification may be necessary.  

13. This lovely quote appears in her video, The Extremism of Veganism: Exposing the Greatest Lie, one of the best videos to expose the violent ideology of carnism, a video you may find here—https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kUTgZ7s_hiw. 

14. After years of debating our everyday treatment of animals, I have come to recognize the refusal to address the reality of factory farming and focus instead on tangential issues as something I can only describe as intellectual dishonesty, however unintentional. I say so not to be harsh, but to remind you to avoid the power and seduction of carnism, a violent ideology that “distorts our thoughts, numbs our feelings,” and corrupts our compassion, as Dr. Melanie Joy writes.  

15. These numbers were calculated using EPA farm classifications and slaughter totals, tabulated by the USDA, available here— https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/. 

16. While it may be useful to test the limits of our moral theories, we should not do so to the complete detriment of the overwhelming reality before us—namely, the moral atrocity of factory farms and slaughterhouses. Instead, we should pursue ethical inquiry while enjoying the benefits of ethical living as well.